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Abstract
Medical research makes intensive use of statistics in order to support its claims.
In this paper we make explicit an epistemological tension between the conduct of
clinical trials and their interpretation: statistical evidence is sometimes discarded on
the basis of an (often) underlined Bayesian reasoning. We suggest that acknowledg-
ing the potentiality of Bayesian statistics might contribute to clarify and improve
comprehension of medical research. Nevertheless, despite Bayesianism may provide
a better account for scientific inference with respect to the standard frequentist ap-
proach, Bayesian statistics is rarely adopted in clinical research. The main reason
lies in the supposed subjective elements characterizing this perspective. Hence, we
discuss this objection presenting the so-called Reference analysis, a formal method
which has been developed in the context of objective Bayesian statistics in order
to define priors which have a minimal or null impact on posterior probabilities.
Furthermore, according to this method only available data are relevant sources of
information, so that it resists the most common criticisms against Bayesianism.
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1 Introduction
How to deal with evidence in empirical sciences has raised many issues in philosophy,
especially when related to other topics such as probability, explanation, and causal-
ity. Contemporary debates on evidence are prominent among philosophers of medicine
especially since the birth of the Evidence Based Medicine movement in the 90s. In par-
ticular, one of the most discussed issues is whether or not bare statistical evidence may
be considered reliable for warranting a scientific hypothesis; a good example may be the
causal relation existing between a drug and the remission of some disease or, consider-
ing occupational epidemiology, the relation between workers’ exposition to a particular
substance and a certain pathology. As expected, across the relevant philosophical lit-
erature, the answer to this question is negative (the reader may refer to Cartwright
(2007) and Cartwright (2010), Worrall (2010), Stegenga (2011), Clarke et al. (2014)).
Despite these critiques, statistical studies - such as Randomized Clinical Trials (RCT)
and meta-analysis - are, as a matter of fact, the gold standard methodology of clinical
research, and several important decisions are actually made on the basis of their results,
as, for instance, the approval of a new drug. This is because, as it has been argued time
and again (cfr. Teira (2011), Teira and Reiss (2013)), RCTs are so far the best method
to deliver what Porter (1996) describes as “procedural objectivity”: since we trust the
research methodology, we can agree on experimental results, no matter personal beliefs.
Having said that, in the following sections we are going to show that this supposed
objectivity is a scientific ideal rather than a characterizing and inherent property of
scientific knowledge: it seems indeed that medical consensus does not arise straightfor-
wardly from the results of clinical research, as one would expect. In support of this view
in Section 2 we present two case studies: in the former, RCTs have been conducted to
prove the efficacy of alternative remedies; although statistically significant results have
been obtained in favor of the efficacy of distant healing, the scientific community is
reluctant to accept the results. Whereas, in the latter, drugs for adolescent depression
have been tested in several clinical trials with inconsistent results: in this case, how-
ever, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved the drugs, and physicians are
largely prescribing them. One may legitimately ask why it is the case that statistical
evidence is sometimes arbitrarily accepted or rejected. In Section 3 we offer a potential
epistemic explanation, suggesting that a Bayesian framework might contribute to clar-
ify and improve comprehension of medical research, since these case studies show how
2
personal beliefs play a prominent role in accepting or refuting a scientific hypothesis.
Against this background, despite Bayesianism can better account for scientific infer-
ence, Bayesian statistics (an approach to inferential statistics in which also pre-existing
knowledge is taken into account) is rarely adopted in clinical research. The main reason
lies in the supposed subjectivity of Bayesianism, or more precisely, the supposed subjec-
tive selection of priors. Hence, in Section 4 we present the so-called Reference analysis,
a formal method which has been developed in the context of objective Bayesian statis-
tics1 in order to define objective priors the so-called “non-informative priors”, i.e. priors
which have a minimal or null impact on posterior probabilities. Finally, in Section 5 we
conclude that Bayesian statistics allows also for more transparent inferences.
2 Case Studies
To illustrate the point that statistical evidence alone does not by itself determine the
amount of credibility that is granted to a given medical hypothesis, we focus on two
therapeutic interventions, looking at the impact of single studies and meta-analyses
as reflected in medical guidelines and commentaries. These studies test the efficacy
of the following interventions: (i) prayer or other forms of "distant healing", (ii) the
use of selective serotonin re-uptake inhibitors (SSRIs) to treat children and adolescents’
depression.
2.1 The Effect of Distant Healing
A study contained in Leibovici (2011) published in the British Medical Journal explored
the effect of distant, retroactive intercessory prayer in hospitalized patients with blood-
stream infections. The study was performed on a large sample of patients (3393 adults)
who were hospitalized between 1990 and 1996; the prayer was spoken in July 2000. The
patients were randomly assigned either to the intervention, that is a prayer was spoken
over the list of their names several years after their hospitalization, or to the control
arm, i.e. no intervention. The clinical outcomes compared were the duration of stay in
hospital, the duration of fever, and the overall mortality.
Notably, the intervention group showed shorter duration of fever (p = 0.04) and
shorter stay in the hospital (p = 0.01). The results were published in December 2001,
partly as a Christmas joke (the article also featured an image of a cervical smear re-
sembling Rudolph the reindeer), and partly as a reaction to the previous published sys-
tematic review of studies assessing the efficacy of distant healing (Astin et al. (2001)).
In that review the authors came to the conclusion that despite some methodological
limitations present in the majority of the studies, further investigation the efficacy of
distant healing is advisable since the 57% (13 of 23) of the included studies showed sta-
tistically significant treatment effects. Both Leibovici’s trial and the systematic review
of Astin et al. were published alongside comments on how to interpret these results.
Many commentators addressed the methodological weaknesses in the trials, but there
were also commentaries dealing with deeper issues. For instance, Ted Kaptchuk, known
for his research on alternative medicine and placebo effect, asked:
Will more trials of distant healing with increased methodological rigor be
helpful? If the results of such trials are negative, there is no problem: rational
1While Reference analysis is not the only available proposal with which one may establish objective
priors, it is certainly a good case study being it a major approach in this field.
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and empirical knowledge agree. If the results of such trials are positive, would
the evidence be persuasive?
He concludes:
It seems that the decision concerning acceptance of evidence (either in medicine
or in religion) ultimately reflects the beliefs of the person that exist before
all arguments and observation (Kaptchuk (2001)).
2.2 The Effect of SSRI Fluoxetine on Children and Adolescent De-
pression
In 2002 a placebo-controlled RCT on the effect of the SSRI fluoxetine (marketed as
Prozac) in children and adolescents with depression was published in The Journal of the
American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry (Emslie et al. (1997)). Fluoxe-
tine was associated with greater mean improvement in the Children’s Depression Rating
Scale score compared to placebo though only slightly (p < 0.05). The conclusion was that
“Fluoxetine 20 mg daily appears to be well tolerated and effective for acute treatment of
MDD in child and adolescent outpatients”. In 2004, after reports of increased suicide risk
in children on SSRI antidepressant medication raised a public scandal, a meta-analysis
of randomized controlled trials for various marketed SSRI-compounds was conducted,
examining the evidence for their efficacy and safety in children and adolescents (Whit-
tington et al. (2004)). The authors included both published and unpublished trials, in
order to minimize publication bias. The results were unsatisfactory: the evidence for the
efficacy of selective serotonin re-uptake inhibitors was inconsistent. Some trials for some
compounds showed a significant effect, often just a small one, while others did not. As a
conclusion, a need for more well-designed trials and greater transparency was expressed.
Nonetheless, the same authors in the same paper emphasized fluoxetine as an efficacious,
safe drug with a positive risk-benefit ratio based on two RCTs showing slightly positive
effects and the meta-analysis. Fluoxetine remains the only SSRI approved by the FDA
for treating children and adolescents with depression (age 8 and older).
3 Discussion
We are aware that data regarding the efficacy of psychotropic drugs is murky, to say the
least: scandals about withheld negative results, fabricated data, and biased ghostwrit-
ers abound. On the other hand, the harm done to people choosing for the ineffective
“alternative” treatments in life threatening illnesses is real as well. Biases introduced
because of personal interests (may they be of financial nature or not) and/or by experi-
mental sloppy design are real problems in clinical trials (and more generally in applied
statistics), may they be for alternative or conventional therapies. Nonetheless, there
are differences in the evaluation of the diverse therapeutic approaches that cannot be
explained by the aforementioned factors.
While the publication of the study regarding retroactive prayer’s efficacy in a medical
journal may be clearly interpreted as a joke, or at most to spark philosophical discus-
sion, the latter study concerning the efficacy of SSRIs in children and adolescents has
had profound practical consequences, since it led to the market approval by the FDA.
Moreover, although the present evidence is inconclusive, the majority of medical doctors
and regulators probably would agree that conducting more unbiased trials with SSRIs
would benefit our knowledge about their efficacy, while conducting more accurate tri-
als on the efficacy of prayer or homeopathic remedies likely would not. In addition,
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meta-analyses in the second case study would regard a rather specific intervention (a
certain molecule tested for a specific indication in a well defined group of people), while
the meta-analyses of trials investigating the impact of distant healing may concern a
relatively broader (and not well defined!) range of interventions and indications: “Meta-
analysis of molecule-based therapies”, even if it were feasible, does not sound like a good
idea, but on the other hand “Meta-analysis of trials of Muslim prayer at noon against
ear infection” sounds like a real waste of time and resources.
But why should it be so? There seems to be a deeper question concerning the
standard statistical practice: is it possible that careful statistical analyses based solely
on data, as the classical approach to inferential statistics requires, provide correct and
complete answers to a given problem disregarding the context (and the relative available
knowledge) in which a certain study is conducted?
3.1 We are all Bayesian
The most persuading answer, in our opinion, comes from the Bayesian approach to
philosophy of science. In this regard, John Worrall (Worrall (2010)) claims that results of
a certain class of studies like that of Leibovici are refuted by medical scientific community
because actually we are all naturally Bayesian: at the moment of inference we cannot
do without our beliefs. We cannot rationally accept the efficacy of retroactive prayer,
since we are certain, according to our background knowledge, that it cannot have any
effect, even though there is some statistical result showing precisely the contrary.
In Bayesian jargon, the statistical evidence obtained is not robust enough in order
to modify our prior degree of belief in the efficacy of retroactive prayer for bloodstream
infections, which is reasonably zero. As Leibovici (2011) points out: “if the pre-trial
probability is infinitesimally low, the results of the trial will not really change it, and the
trial should not be performed”. On its part, Worrall concludes that “Fisher’s insistence
on not bringing any prior information into the assessment of the impact of a stochastic
experiment in order to guarantee the objectivity was an understandable but grievous
and enormously error”.
Although Worrall is not concerned with the limitations of classical statistical infer-
ence, he grasps a fundamental point about it: as a matter of fact, the claim of “objec-
tivity” of frequentist analysis is somehow illusory, because many factors actually affect
the interpretation of the results. When we come across borderline cases, the credibility
of medical claims is measured by how much they resemble the generally accepted frame-
work. For instance, even if the specific mechanistic explanation is not established, the
model of how serotonin re-uptake inhibitors work matches the expectations that clini-
cians have about a therapy for psychiatric disorder. These expectations are developed
through accumulating data from in vitro and animal studies, by breakthroughs in other
areas of medicine which all shaped our “medical Weltanschauung”.
If it is true that we are all naturally Bayesian, then one may reasonably expect
an implementation of formal Bayesian methods to analyze data. Indeed, the idea that
Bayesian statistical inference can enhance the interpretation of randomized clinical trials
is widespread also in scientific literature. For instance, Wijeysundera et al. (2009) argue
that Bayesian statistical analysis overcomes several limitations of frequentist statistics.
First of all “it permits inductive inference by reporting the clinically relevant probabilities
for specified treatment effects”, secondly “it can determine the probability for varying
magnitudes of therapeutic response”, and finally, above all, it can incorporate external
information (e.g. previous evidence, biological plausibility, pre-existing beliefs) when
interpreting the result of a study.
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Generally, three specific components are necessary in order to analyze the results
of a clinical trial in a Bayesian way: (i) the prior probability, (ii) the likelihood, and
the (ii) posterior probability. The prior is the probability assigned a priori, based on
information independent of the study to a hypothesis or to a parameter to be estimated,
the likelihood is a function (not a probability function!) of an unknown parameter given
a set of observed outcomes, and the posterior is the end-result, i.e. the probability of
the hypothesis given the data resulting from the study and prior information, which can
be calculated using Bayes’ theorem:
P (θ|D) = P (D|θ)P (θ)
P (D)
where P (θ|D) is the conditional probability of the parameter θ knowing the the observed
data D. The posterior P (D|θ) expresses the probability that the observed outcomes D
have been caused by (or in general terms causally related to) the θ, while P (θ) is the
prior probability assigned to θ.2
In their study Wijesyundera and colleagues used Bayesian methods to reanalyze
RCTs published in high-impact general medical journals and they found that for positive
studies Bayesian and frequentist analyses had good agreement for the presence of any
benefit. They close: “Bayesian inference reports probabilities that are theoretically
consistent with the probabilities that clinicians are interested in, can be calculated for a
range of clinically relevant effects and can be adjusted for differing pre-existing beliefs”.
To conclude, Bayesian reasoning seems a reliable way to describe what actually hap-
pens in medical research when decision-making, interpretation and report of randomized
clinical trials are at stake. It seems to work quite well even as a normative claim: per-
forming a Bayesian analysis is a more profitable way to justify the interpretation of
results. As the epidemiologist Vandenbroucke says:
Science is an intrinsically human affair. When new theories are created and
new evidence sought, judgment will retain a subjective element. This does
not mean that it is impossible to sift out which interpretation is more valuable
(Vandenbroucke (2005)).
Then it seems clear that if there exists an important subjective component in scientific
processes, then a Bayesian framework may be the best way to take it into account, since
currently it is the only perspective incorporating it.
3.2 Everyone is not a Bayesian
Nevertheless, according to a recent review, Bayesian trials are still a small niche in
medical literature (Jack Lee and Chu (2012)), since the medical community is very
2It is useful to emphasize that in the context of Bayesian statistics
probability is always a function of two arguments, the event E whose uncertainty is being
measured, and the conditions C under which the measurement takes place; “absolute”
probabilities do not exist. In typical applications, one is interested in the probability of
some event E given the available data D, the set of assumptions A which one is prepared
to make about the mechanism which has generated the data, and the relevant contextual
knowledge K which might be available. Thus, Pr(E|D,A,K) is to be interpreted as a
measure of (presumably rational) belief in the occurrence of the event E, given data D,
assumptions A and any other available knowledge K, as a measure of how “likely” is the
occurrence of E in these conditions (Bernardo (2003), p. 4).
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reluctant to adopt Bayesian statistics in clinical research for its subjective component.
Thus, it is mandatory to understand whether or not this critique to Bayesian statistics
and to Bayesianism in general is justified. One has to acknowledge that priors are
subjective and there is not a standard way to establish them; for instance, it is easy to
imagine an hypothetical situation in which there is no information at all about a new
treatment so that, in this case, the prior probability would be uninformative, basically it
would be a flat distribution that permits the posterior to be determined almost entirely
by the data. Then an enthusiastic prior and a skeptical prior might be constructed
too and the posterior would be different according to which prior has been chosen.
Indeed, the fundamental objection to Bayesian statistics addresses its subjectivist strand:
the idea that prior and posterior distributions represent subjective states of knowledge.
Here the concern is, first, that scientists should be concerned with objective knowledge
rather than subjective beliefs, and second, that it is not clear how to assess subjective
knowledge in any case (Gelman and Hennig (2017)). Although the apparent difficulty to
meet the standard of objectivity within a Bayesian framework is not the only reason to
discard Bayesian statistics, it is probably the most important, as pointed out by Efron
(Efron (1986)): “the topic of objectivity [is] in my opinion the linchpin of non-Bayesian
success with statistical practitioners”. Indeed, objectivity is one of the crucial factors
discriminating scientific thinking from wishful thinking. We all have a special, but
apparently justified, expectation: scientists have to draw the same conclusion starting
from the same set of data, no matter personal beliefs. This is the main reason why
everyone is not a Bayesian. Let us discuss this point.
In the first place, looking carefully at the classical approach to inferential statistics it
is possible to find components typically ascribed to the Bayesian perspective, i.e. choices
in which a priori knowledge and subjectivity determine the results of the inference. If it
is true, then it seems inappropriate to claim that according to the frequentist account
only sample data are relevant in order to provide information concerning an observed
phenomenon. For instance, in practical situations usually one presupposes the form of
the probabilistic model to adopt in order to analyze a certain kind of problem; it is trivial,
therefore, to conclude that not only sample data are relevant for the inferential process,
but also the previous knowledge of several similar studies and cases must be taken into
account, meaning that this pre-existing knowledge (or prior information) allows us to
automatically select a given model to represent a particular situation of interest. More
precisely, the existing knowledge of the mechanisms that caused the available evidence
is one of the elements responsible for the selection of probabilistic models.
Let us clarify this point with an easy example. Suppose to observe k times the
event “head” in n independent tosses of a fair coin (n Bernoulli experiments). Our
bare evidence consists, thus, in k successes in n independent trials. A relevant piece
of information, however, is not contained in the available evidence: the mechanism
generator of these data. On the one hand, if we consider a fixed number of trials,
the binomial distribution will be the correct model, since it is a perfect representation
of the situation at hand having to do with the number of successes in n independent
experiments, whereas if the n trials are the result of a process requiring the realization
of exactly k “heads”, the correct model will not the binomial distribution, but rather the
negative binomial. Now, if p denotes the occurrence of the event “head”, it is easy to see
that the very same evidence leads to profoundly different conclusions depending on the
mechanism generator of the data, and consequently on the model selection.
In the case we consider a fixed number of tosses, the stochastic variable X presents
the following properties:
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1. Mass probability function f(x) =
(
n
x
)
px(1− p)n−x
2. Mean: E(X) = np
3. Variance: V ar(X) = np(1− p).
Considering the latter case, X is characterized by:
1. Mass probability function: P (X = x) =
(
k + x− 1
x
)
pk(1− p)x
2. Mean: E(X) = k(1− p)/p
3. Variance: V ar(X) = k(1− p)/p2
Furthermore, in our example the likelihood for these generator processes assumes
different values, consequently the estimation of p in these two cases is naturally differ-
ent. Hence, what this examples shows is the relevance that pre-existing knowledge has
when we prefer a certain model to analyze data in particular situations, so that it should
be emphasized that also in the context of classical inferential statistics there are crucial
aspects which are not contained in bare sample data, showing that the alleged objectiv-
ity of the frequentist approach peacefully coexist with prior knowledge and subjective
elements.
More generally, it is worth to be said that usually in statistics subjective elements
are widespread, “starting from data preprocessing via data exploration and choice of
method onto the selection of how to present which results. Realistically, even one-click
methods require user choice on data coding and data exclusion, and these inputs can
have big influences on end results such as p−values and confidence intervals” (Gelman
and Hennig (2017)).
In this regard, following Sprenger (2017), it seems useful to underline that there
is not a clear consensus on what constitutes objectivity in science.3 As well known
in philosophical literature, there are many different accounts of scientific objectivity
and, interestingly for our discussion, at least three of them pose obvious challenges for
Bayesian methods: concordant objectivity, procedural objectivity, and value-free ob-
jectivity.4 Let us discuss them in order to present in the next section some Bayesian
solutions to the problem of objectivity. In the first place, concordant objectivity (inter-
subjectivity) “occurs when a group of people all agree on an outcome” (Kincaid et al.
(2007)); with reference to scientific practice this happens when all the members of the
scientific community agree on experimental results. Intersubjective agreement has been
long considered by philosophers of science as the cornerstone of scientific objectivity (e.g.
one may consider Quine and Davidson’s reflections on this topic). Bayesian inference
clearly violates this sense of objectivity since it opens up the possibility of taking into
account prior knowledge which might vary between individuals: different scientists using
different prior probabilities for analyzing the same data may well reach different con-
clusions. Secondly, values-free objectivity considers values and subjective judgments as
a threat to the impartiality of scientific research. Finally, procedural objectivity occurs
when a standardized experimental design is set up such that the same outcome is always
produced, regardless of who is performing the experiment. This sense of objectivity
3The reader may refer also to Douglas (2009), where eight different senses of scientific objectivity
have been identified.
4These are discussed in detail in Sprenger (2017).
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is particularly influential in the context of clinical trials, as suggested by David Teira
(Teira (2011)) to guarantee the impartiality of medical research with respect to external
interests. Bayesian inference clearly violates these two latter senses as well. Especially in
areas such as medical research where non-scientific interests at stake are high (financial,
ethical, ...) consequence of biased or partial decisions might be very severe. The “trojan
horse” of Bayesian procedures are prior distributions. There “non-fact-based information
[...] will sneak it [...] wreaking havoc on the research’s interpretation” (Moyé (2008)).
4 Reference Analysis: An Objective Approach to Bayesian
Statistics
Usually in the context of Bayesian statistics, if prior information concerning a specific
parameter φ is available, it must be contained in the prior probability. On the contrary,
in cases where no prior information is available, the so-called objective Bayesian frame-
works provide formal methods to define priors with a minimal effect on the posterior
distributions in order to minimize the effects of the prior’s selection and letting the data
“speaking for themselves”. In this regard, it is worth to underline that in such cases
the most relevant source of information are the set of available data, resembling the
methodology of the frequentist approach to statistics.
It is well-known that several answers to the problem of finding priors in situation of
lacunose or absent prior knowledge have been given throughout the history of statistics;
in the first place, Bayes and Laplace tried to solve this issue applying the so-called
principle of insufficient reason: when there is no information available about φ, then
the prior should be defined as a uniform distribution, considering equiprobable every
outcome of φ. Unfortunately, this definition is not satisfactory being not invariant under
re-parametrization: if we do not have information concerning φ, consequently one would
expect that there is no information also regarding 1/φ, however, the uniform priors of
φ and 1/φ are not equivalent. Therefore, one should look for better solutions.
Since the supposed lack of objectivity is a particularly cogent issue for Bayesians,
the literature concerning Bayesian statistics faces directly the problem of the selection
of priors in a formal manner. In fact, in this section we present a specific method
developed primarily by J. Bernardo and J. Berger in order to define objective priors
avoiding by construction the aforementioned problems and objections, i.e. prior with a
minimal or null effect on posterior probabilities, usually called reference priors, hence the
label reference analysis attributed to these authors.5 NB: this methodology obviously
does not exhaust the spectrum of the solutions developed by Bayesian statisticians (cfr.
Kass and Wasserman (1996) for a more systematic discussion of objective approaches in
Bayesian statistics6), but it is a useful example to show that it is possible to limit the
usual objections against the subjective elements presented by the Bayesian perspective.
The essential idea of Bernardo and Berger is to define a function which is able
to maximize the expected divergence between prior and posterior probability distri-
5The following discussion is heavily influenced by Bernardo and Ramon (1998). Furthermore, it is
important to note that this method is invariant under re-parametrization and avoid by construction the
issues affecting the principle of insufficient reason.
6Reference analysis is just a specific objective method to minimize the subjective component of
Bayesian statistics, and other methodologies are also available, e.g. one should consider Jeffreys (1961),
Jaynes (1968). It is important to stress that Jeffreys’ priors and reference priors are equivalent in the
case of one-dimensional parameters, while they diverge in the multidimensional case.
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butions given the observational data, namely a function which maximizes the missing
information in the experiment. Consequently, one should note that one of the most
important feature of reference analysis is the definition of the notion of “missing infor-
mation”. Now, if f(x, θ) is the probability density function of a one-parameter ran-
dom variable X, and T (X) a sufficient statistics for the parameter θ, then, assuming
the availability of Xn1 = (X1, . . . , Xn) = x∗n observations, Bernardo and Berger derive
the prior distribution piref (θ) maximizing the expected value of Kn(pi(θ|xn1 ), pi(θ)) =∫
pi(θ|xn1 )log(pi(θ|xn1 )/pi(θ))dθ, in this case is the Kullback-Leibler distance, which is a
measure of how a given probability distribution pi(θ|xn1 ) diverges from a second probabil-
ity distribution pi(θ), when the latter is used to approximate the former. If Kpin is the ex-
pected value of the distance with respect to X one gets Kpin = Ex∗n
{
Kn
[
pi(θ, x∗n), pi(θ)
]}
,
the reference prior maximizes Kpi∞ = limn→∞Kpin .
To state it alternatively, the reference posterior has the role to specify exactly what
could be learnt and gathered from data concerning a given quantity of interest φ, as-
suming that only the set of observed data provides the available information regarding
it. With Bernardo’s words:
the reference posterior exploits certain well-defined features of a possible
prior, namely those describing a situation were relevant knowledge about
the quantity of interest [...] may be held to be negligible compared to the
information about that quantity which repeated experimentation (from a
particular data generating mechanism) might possibly provide. [...] Any
statistical analysis contains a fair number of subjective elements; these in-
clude (among others) the data selected, the model assumptions, and the
choice of the quantities of interest. Reference analysis may be argued to pro-
vide an “objective” Bayesian solution to statistical inference problems in just
the same sense that conventional statistical methods claim to be “objective”:
in that the solutions only depend on model assumptions and observed data
(Bernardo (2003)).
Insisting again on the concept of information, it is interesting to note that the ref-
erence approach make use of Shannon’s definition of information in order to keep this
notion as precise as possible.7 In the context of reference analysis, the more prior
knowledge is available the less information is expected to be gained by the performance
of experiments, so that the amount of information which is expected from an experiment
depends strictly on (i.e. is a function of) the available prior knowledge. Thus, the core
idea of the reference analysis may be rephrased as follows:
An infinitely large experiment would eventually provide all missing infor-
mation; thus, it is possible to obtain a measure of the amount of missing
information as a limiting form of a functional of the prior distribution. It
is natural to define “vague” prior knowledge as that with the largest missing
information: the reference prior should then be that which maximizes the
missing information. (Bernardo and Ramon (1998))
Hence, as we have seen a few lines above, the reference prior is defined as a limit of a
sequence of prior distributions which maximizes the expected information in the long
run, i.e. “from an increasingly number of experiments”.
7The reader should refer to Soofi (1994) for a useful introduction to the technical notion of information
applied in statistics.
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More precisely, taking into account the simplest case of one parameter8, considering
an experiment consisting in the observation of a specific set of data D generated by a
probability model p(D|φ), which depend only on the quantity of interest φ, and letting
be t = t(D) ∈ T a sufficient statistic about the observed data, the expected amount of
information I{T , p(φ)} provided by the gathered data D concerning φ, given the prior
knowledge p(φ) is defined as follows:
I{T , p(φ)} =
∫
T
∫
Φ
p(t, φ)log
p(t, φ)
p(t)p(φ)
dφdt,
According to this definition, the amount of information provided by the data is de-
fined by the “expected logarithmic divergence of the prior from the posterior” (Bernardo
(2003)), what a few lines above we have written in terms of the Kullback-Leibler dis-
tance. This definition tells us that the missing information about the quantity φ would
be provided by k independent repetitions of the experiment; thus, in the long run, as
k →∞, I{T , p(φ)} will ideally provide any missing information concerning φ.
The last step to the definition of the reference prior is to consider, for large k, an
asymptotic approximation of the posterior distribution (which does not depend on the
priors) from which it is possible to derive a sequence of positive functions which are
able to induce a sequence of posterior distributions via Bayes theorem, containing the
desired reference posterior distribution. With Bernardo’s words: “the reference prior
function pi(φ) of a univariate parameter φ is defined to be the limit of the sequence
of the proper priors pik(φ)which maximize I{T , p(φ)} in the precise sense that, for any
value of the sufficient statistic t = t(D), the reference posterior, the intrinsic limit pi(φ|t)
of the corresponding sequence of posteriors {pik(φ|t)}, may be obtained from pi(φ) by
formal use of Bayes theorem, so that pi(φ|t) ∝ p(t|φ)pi(φ)” (Bernardo (2003), notation
adapted).
Now that we have loosely introduced the main ideas of the reference analysis, it is
worth to emphasize that reference priors are not probability distributions, but rather
functions. This fact implies that they should not be considered degree of beliefs with
respect to a certain proposition. Moreover, in support of this fact, often reference pri-
ors are not proper probability distributions since do not integrate one. However, it is
technically possible to obtain proper posteriors from improper priors. The interested
reader should refer to Bernardo (1997) for details and to Syversveen (1998) and Kass
and Wasserman (1996) for a detailed discussion of problematic/artificial aspects of ref-
erence analysis and open problems for future research. Another relevant aspect which
deserves to be mentioned is the interpretation of such priors. Firstly, they should not
be interpreted as a measure or a representation of ignorance, but they should be rather
compared to a default option in a certain computer package (remarkably, the term “ref-
erence prior” may recall the idea of standardization); Kass and Wasserman (1996) say
“[i]n principle, we could construct a systematic catalog of reference priors for a variety of
models. The priors in the catalog do not represent ignorance, but are useful in problems
where it is too difficult to elicit an appropriate subjective prior. The statistician may
feel that the reference prior is [...] a good approximation to any reasonable subjective
prior for that problem”. Thus, there is no an objective prior representing ignorance, and
one should keep in mind that the definition of reference priors strictly depends on the
inference problem at hand.
8More complex cases and examples are discussed in great detail in Bernardo (2003) and Bernardo
and Ramon (1998).
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Having briefly discussed an objective Bayesian approach, it is possible to speculate
on how one may reply to the previous critiques concerning objectivity. It is crucial
to underline that often the term “objectivity” refers to the independence of personal
biases, as Gelman and Hennig (2017) point out, and it seems fair to claim that objec-
tive Bayesian approaches try to provide methods to construct priors in this direction,
yielding algorithms based on transparent assumptions and reproducible results. To this
regard, concordant objectivity is not violated, since given a particular problem objective
priors are by construction defined in order to lead to the same posterior distribution.
Hence, different statisticians will agree on the final probability distributions. Recall-
ing the passage of Kass and Wasserman quoted a few lines above, in cases in which it
is possible define an objective prior, the problem of intersubjectivity vanishes because
such objective priors represent optimal approximations of subjective priors, so that the
subjective elements do not influence the process of inference and data analysis.
In second place, one may also say that Bernardo’s proposal (among others, e.g.
those of Jeffreys and Jaynes mentioned in footnote 4) being formal procedures satisfy by
construction several epistemic virtues: not only methodological transparency, but also
clear and rigorous argumentation, and impartiality. This fact allows to reply also to the
Values Free objection. Gelman and Hennig writes, in this regard, that
[f]ormal statistical methods contribute to objectivity as far as they contribute
to the fulfillment of these desiderata [transparency and impartiality], partic-
ularly by making procedures and their implied rationales transparent and
unambiguous (Gelman and Hennig (2017)).
Finally, procedural objectivity is essential also in the context of objective Bayesian
statistics, since only data gathered from experiments are relevant for the definition of
such priors (trivially, reference priors have been created specifically in order to have the
minimal effect on posterior distributions). This specific trait of reference analysis should
make this proposal appealing also to frequentist, since the main difference between the
Bayesian and frequentist statistics lies in the fact the according to the latter only data
are relevant.
In sum, we are well aware that currently there is not a unique point of view in the
Bayesian community on the validity of objective approaches; however, although it is
true that objectivity may be seen as an ambition rather than an achievement as Gelman
and Hennig (2017) underline, these approaches aim to achieve something more than
desirable, i.e. a sort of standardized priors to use in situations where there is an effective
absence of information. Be that as it may, these approaches certainly show how it is
possible to provide convincing answers to the usual objections against Bayesianism.
5 Conclusion
Let us conclude summarizing what we achieved in this paper. At the very beginning we
questioned the idea that scientific consensus on medical claims is obtained throughout
accumulation of RCTs. We briefly presented two case studies which starkly clash with
that idea. From a pure epistemic standpoint, we can explain the interpretation of exper-
imental results appealing to Bayesian inference. Following John Worrall, we suggested
that we are all naturally Bayesian: the credibility of medical studies is measured by how
much they resemble already existing knowledge. We cannot neither accept the efficacy of
retroactive prayer nor completely regard SSRI as ineffective, despite statistical evidence
showing the opposite is available. Hence, a Bayesian framework seems to better capture
12
the achievement of medical consensus, considering available information in assessing the
results of clinical studies. Nonetheless, Bayesian statistics is rarely adopted in clinical
research because of its putative subjectivity in selecting prior probabilities. In contrast,
not only we have underlined that also in the frequentist account to inferential statistics
several decisions are taken considering pre-existing knowledge and subjective beliefs, but
also we presented a formal method which allows a rigorous definition of priors in specific
situations where prior information available is negligible. This method does not violate
the senses of scientific objectivity which traditionally pose challenges to the Bayesian
perspective.
Finally, the adoption of an objective Bayesian statistical analysis would have a further
advantage, that is allowing for more transparency. As far we are concerned with scientific
objectivity, methodological transparency plays a key role. For instance, with respect to
the fluoxetine case, a Bayesian analysis would have made the data more transparent and
compelling, without the possibility for the authors to subjectively assess the safety and
efficacy of the drug.
In clinical research transparency becomes paramount, because all the methodological
choices made by the experimenters might have a significant impact on final results, hence
they should be motivated on the basis of rational criteria. As recently argued by Gelman
and Hening (Gelman and Hennig (2017)) the adoption of prior probabilities makes the
researchers’ point of view more transparent. As they put it, “[t]he merit of objectivist
Bayesianism is that the approach comes with a much stronger drive to justify prior
distributions in a transparent way using principles that are as clear and general as
possible”.
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